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A Second

LETTER

To a FRIEND ;

Giving a more particular NARRATIVE of the Defeat
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
French Army at Lake-George

By the *New-England* Troops, than has yet been published :

Representing also the vast *Importance* of this
Conquest to the *American-British-Colonies*.

To which is added,

Such an Account of what the *New-England* Governments have done to carry into Effect their Design against *Crown-Point*, as will shew the Necessity of their being help'd by *Great-Britain*, in Point of Money.



B O S T O N : N. E.

Printed and Sold by *Edes and Gill*, at their Printing-Office, near
to the Prison in *Queen-Street*, M.DCC.LV.

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A Second LETTER to a Friend, relating to the Defeat of the *French* and *Indians* at *Lake-George*.

SIR,

IN my letter to you, relating to the *Ohio-Defeat*, I took a brief Notice of our *Crown-point* expedition; discovering some uneasiness at its having been so long delayed. I am now well pleased with that delay; as it has given occasion to the *greatest Action*, in its kind, that ever happened in *North-America*. Never was such a battle fought here before! — Never had we opportunity before of gaining so glorious a conquest over so great an army! — I gave it also as my opinion, “that the *New-England* troops, by reason of this delay, would have the *whole power* of *Canada* to contend with;” in which I happened to make a right judgment. For, the day you published my letter, an express arrived from General *Johnson*, advising, “that the spies he had sent out were returned, and bro’t him intelligence, that *all Canada* was in motion, the roads filled with waggons, transporting all manner of stores to *Crown-Point*, and numbers of men continually going there to reinforce *Fort-Frederick* :” Upon which the *General* went on to say, “that a large reinforcement was, in this situation of affairs, absolutely necessary on our side;” recommending it to the several *New-England* colonies “to be as speedy in making it as might be;” and assuring them, “that, in the mean time, instead of being idle, he would employ his men in building a *Fort* at the entrance upon the carrying-place towards *Lake George*, or, as the *French* call it, *Lake Sacrament*, and after that, clear a road thro’ the carrying-place to the head of the *Lake*, and build another fort at that important pass, by which time he hoped the reinforcements would be raised and sent, enabling him to proceed on his design.” It was while our *General* was at this pass, and before he had built the second fort, or received any reinforcements, that he was attacked by the *French* and *Indians*.

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You have probably seen his Letter to the *Governours of the several Colonies* concerned in the *Crown-point* expedition; giving an account of his engagement with, and success against, the enemy: For it was printed the very day it came to hand, that every one might be acquainted with its contents. And if you have seen this letter, you must be pleased with it, and conceive an high opinion of the *General's* merit. Perhaps, the best bred *regular* could not have disposed matters under like circumstances, with greater wisdom.— And the vein of modesty that runs thro' his whole narrative cannot but recommend him to all who are capable of discernment.— But as his letter was wrote so soon after the action, it was impossible the account of things should be particular enough to satisfy the curiously inquisitive.

I shall therefore give you a *summary Abstract* of what we have more lately received, that may be depended on for fact; from whence you will easily be let into a clear and just Idea of this whole Matter. And, as you will probably expect it from me, I shall hereupon add a few thoughts tending to set the *importance* of this conquest in a proper light before you; not forgetting, before I finish, to acquaint you with the *reinforcements* the *New-England* colonies have raised and sent to guard against a disappointment as to the *present expedition*: Upon which you will be at no loss to determine, that the burden laid upon the *New-England* colonies is, in point of *charge*, far beyond what they are able to bear, if *Great-Britain* does not interpose for our help.

I have been at the pains to consider and compare a number of Letters, which have been sent from the army, especially from the officers in it, and those among them, whose Character I am acquainted with. I have likewise had personal conversation with a Gentleman of distinction, who, a full week after the action was over, was sent an express by the *General* to this town; and with another also who came away about the same time: And the *sum* of what I have collected, I shall relate to you under *three divisions*, answerable to the *three engagements* our men had with the enemy.

On the 7th of this instant, a number of *Mohawks*, who had been out as scouts, returned, and informed the *General*, that they had found three large roads from the south-bay, which they were satisfied could not be made but by the marching of so many considerable bodies of men, who were probably gone to attack our fort at the carrying place.

face. The *General*, upon this, dispatched two expresses * that evening to Col. *Blanchard*, the commanding officer *there*, the latter of which returned about 12 o'clock with this account, "that they had both heard and seen the enemy, and that they were about four miles from the fort." A council of war having been call'd the next morning, the result was, that a 1000 men should be detached from the army under the command of Col. *Williams*, with 200 Indians under the command of *Hendrick* the *Mohawk sachem*, and sent to annoy the enemy, whether at the fort, or in their retreat from it, either as victorious, or defeated. This was accordingly done, without any loss of time; and it made way for, what I call, the *first* engagement. For this detachment had not marched above 2 miles and an $\frac{1}{2}$ before they *unexpectedly* found themselves within reach of the enemy. They were first discovered by an advanced Party of *Indians*, with *Hendrick* at their head; who immediately fired upon them. This gave the alarm to Col. *Williams*, who endeavoured with a number of men to secure a rocky eminence hard by, from whence, as from a point of vantage, he might annoy the enemy. But, as they had intelligence of his march, by a scout they had sent out, they had secured the ground before, lay there in ambuscade, and upon his approach within reach of their guns, they rose up, fir'd, and kill'd him, and many more, dead on the spot. By this time the fight became very fierce on both sides. The advanced party of *Indians* behaved with the most intrepidity; but perceiving they should be surrounded, and destroyed, they gave way; and as they passed by our men, they told them of their danger, and advised to a retreat. They went on notwithstanding, fighting with undaunted courage and resolution; but finding themselves over-powered with numbers, and almost encircled, they quitted the ground, firing as they gave back with constancy and bravery. Five or six Hundred of them retreated with such dexterity, and vigorous exertment, that the return of this detachment to the camp is hereby rendered, in a manner, safe and easy. The *French General* owned, that we kill'd more of his men in this fight, than we lost of our own. And my informer assures me, this acknowledgment of his was agreeable to the truth of fact. For he saw himself, the

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Mr. *Adams*, the first express was killed by the enemy in going to the fort; and General *Johnson's* letter sent by him to Col. *Blanchard* was found in the *Aid de Camp's* Pocket.

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next day, and counted, upwards of 140 dead bodies in the place wh
 the fight first began; tho' he could not tell the precise number
 were *French*, because they had been stripped by the *Indians*, and
 naked. And besides this heap, as it were, of dead bodies, he t
 me, they were scattered more or less the whole way between
 place where the engagement began, and the Camp. He further g
 me to understand, that he took out his watch, when the fire was f
 heard at the camp; that he penciled the time; that it was precis
 11 o'clock wanting 5 minutes; and that the retreat was not finish
 till $\frac{1}{2}$ after 12: So that this retreat, and the fight previous to it, co
 tinued one hour and 35 minutes; from whence it appears, that o
 men were not over hasty in getting out of the way of danger: For th
 were distant from the camp no more than 2 miles and an $\frac{1}{2}$. † To
 it seems very wonderful, considering the superiority of the enemy,
 number, and their coming upon our men *unawares*, that they we
 not intirely routed.

Some have found fault with this detachment; supposing that th
 should rather have been cut to pieces, than have turned their bac
 upon the enemy. But they herein talk wildly. A good retreat
 the next glory to a victory. When troops are over-powered wi
 numbers, and unawares too, the truest courage is discovered in d
 vising and executing the best methods to come off with as little lo
 as may be. Had our men been upon equal terms with the enem
 I should have tho't they had acted unworthy of the Name of *New*
England men, if they had given way upon any consideration wha
 ever. But they had now to contend, not only with a large body o
regular veterans, but with *irregular* troops more numerous tha
 themselves. And, under these circumstances, what would *bravery*
 conducted by wisdom, direct to, but to make as good a retreat a
 they could. They might have stood, 'tis true, till they had all bee
 killed; but, in that case, they would have justly merited the cha
 racter of mad-men. 'Tis probable, I own, this retreat (at least i
 regard of a number) might be attended with surprize, disorder an
 confusion: And it must otherwise have been miraculous; as many o

† General *Johnson*, judging of the distance by the fire, says, it was 3 or 4 miles; bu
 my informer assures me, he was present with the surveyer, when the distance be
 tween the fort at the carrying-place, and camp, was accurately measured with
 chain; that it was 13 miles; and that the distance of the place where this fig
 began, from the camp, was no more than 2 miles and an $\frac{1}{2}$ at farthest.

young Men were here, who never before heard a gun fired in anger. Besides, there was not so much as one *regular* in our whole army, either among the officers, or private men.—And further, they were now engaged, not with *regulars* only, but with *Canadians* and *Indians*, the manner of whose fighting is *irregular* and *confused*.—The order to me is, not that they retreated, or that numbers of them might be disordered in their retreat; but that they should be able, on the whole, to make so good a retreat; annoying the enemy while they were retreating, and yet managing their retreat so to come off with comparatively so small a loss. Col. *Williams*, Major *Ashley*, Capt. *Ingersol*, Capt. *Porter*, Capt. *Ferral*, Capt. *Stodart*, Capt. *McGin*, Capt. *Stevens*, Lieuts. *Burt* and *Pumroy*, fell in this engagement, with a considerable number of our private men. *Hendrick*, the noted *Mohawk* Sachem, fell likewise, with a number of *Indians*.

It may properly eno' be observed here;—when the *Mohawks* found their great *Sachem* dead and scalped, they were exceedingly enraged; surrounding the tent where the *French General* lay, and insisting that he should be delivered into their hands, that they might scalp him also. It was with great difficulty he was saved from falling a sacrifice to their fury. Our officers were obliged to remove him from tent to tent to keep him concealed from them, and finally found it necessary, notwithstanding the badness of his wounds, to transport him privately to *Albany*; where he now is in a dangerous condition, if on this side the grave. The *French* haven't behaved thus humanly and kindly towards *English* Prisoners. When they hear of this and other civilities towards their *General*, and the other captives with him, it will, I hope, make them ashamed of their past conduct, and teach them to treat our people in a more human way, should any fall into *their* and the *Indian's* hands, while united in any action.

It was not long after the return of this detachment to the Camp, before the enemy appeared in sight, and found our men in readiness to give them a warm reception. This was owing to the notice they had of their approaching towards them, and the gradual manner of it, occasioned by the above fight and retreat. It might have been of dangerous consequence, had they suddenly made an attack upon our camp; but as we had this warning, opportunity was happily given

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given us to throw up a *breast-work* of trees (as General *John* calls it); to plant a number of cannon in suitable places about to take possession of some eminences on our left flank, under the guard of a field-piece advantageously situated; to line our breast-work throughout with men; and, in short, to put things in the best disposition, time and circumstances would permit, to defend ourselves and destroy the enemy. And now came on the *second Battle*, perhaps the most furious and resolute, on both sides, that ever was fought in *North-America*. It opened between 11 and 12 o'clock (keeping to the General's account) with the fire of the *French* regulars; but in a few minutes, the fire became general, and nothing was heard but the noise of guns. This part of the attack was mostly made upon our left wing, bearing towards the center; and it was principally sustained by the *Connecticut* troops, who behaved with great activity and valor. When the *French* found, upon a long and obstinate trial, that they must be destroyed if they continued here, they moved to the right of our camp, where the *Massachusetts* regiments were posted; and upon this attack also they maintained a brisk and resolute fire for a long time, but were so weaken'd by the warm and dextrous opposition they met with, that their fire gradually grew feeble, and with occasional servable intermissions: Upon which our brave men, together with the *Indians*, jumped over the breast-work, resolutely fell upon the *hatchet* in hand, drove them off the ground, pursued after them, slew a great many, and took about 30 prisoners, among whom was Baron *de Dieskau*, the General of all the troops lately come to *Canada* from *France*.

This Engagement, with the pursuit, lasted about 7 hours. Our loss was less now, than in the former fight; but the loss on the side of the *French* was greater: According to the best accounts we killed, in this battle, 3 or 4 hundred of their men, officers and private soldiers.

When General *Johnson's* letter first came to town, we were ready to think, the *French* must have lost at least a thousand men; as the battle was of such long continuance, and we had the advantage of Cannon, and a *Breast-work* of trees to defend ourselves. Our Idea also of the bravery of the *French* was, by reason of this advantage, very much enlarged; and it seemed nothing extraordinary that our army, under the above circumstances, should get the better of them.

am. But, from Major *Hore*, who came to this Government last week upon an Errand from the army, is one of its officers, and was excellently active in the late fight; as also from another Gentleman who came since, we were led to conceive more justly of the matter. Our wonder now was, not that a 1000 were not killed, but that so many as 3 or 400 should be slain in this battle. For their account "that the battle was fought upon a plain, covered with pitch-pine trees, of various sizes, some smaller, some greater, as is common in such plains, in their natural state of wildness, and a thick under-growth of shrubs, intermixed with brakes, as high as a man's waste; that no part of the plain was cleared, except only the road we had made from the fort to the Carrying-place to the Camp; that the *French* *regulars* marched on this road, and began the fight drawn up in order; that they kept their order but a small space of time, not long enough to receive a second discharge from our Cannon; and that the battle was now carried on in the *Indian* way by the whole *French* army, *regulars* as well *irregulars*, some fighting behind trees, and stumps, and others standing so as to be defended by the under-growth of shrubs and brakes." 'Tis easy, upon this Representation of the Matter, to see, that the enemy were upon equal terms with us, tho' we had a kind of breast-work; nay, as it was nothing more [so I am inform'd by one that was present when it was made] than bodies of trees laid lengthwise upon the ground, round the Camp, and in many places so as not to touch one another, I am ready to think, they had the advantage of us; especially as the under-growth near the Camp had been cut down for the convenience of the army. And from hence also it will not appear strange, if our Cannon [three or four which were the only ones that could be used, and these not more than 3 or 4 rounds, it being to little purpose to fire them] did not do them the damage, we, upon the first hearing of the story, might be apt to imagine. The plain truth is, after the *regulars* became *regulars* in the manner of their fighting, there was no great slaughter made, either by our Cannon, or random Musquetry. The chief execution was now done, partly by our men's watching for opportunities to fire, when they could catch any of the *French* or *Indians* within full view; for they are most of them so dextrous in the use of the Gun, as to be pretty sure of taking a man down within an hundred yards distance: And partly, by their rushing upon them, to-

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wards the close of the battle, and pursuing them, not only with their Guns, but hatchets also. *

Our men, after they had entered on action, were least fearful of any ill consequence from the *regulars* ; and they suffered least from them : Tho' none among the enemy suffered so much from us as *these regulars*, thro' their unacquaintedness with the *American* method of fighting. Few of them, comparatively, whether officers, or private men, are tho't to have escaped with their lives. How else can it be accounted for, that the *General* should be taken alone ? So I was particularly informed he was by Major *Hore*, whose account of this fact is confirmed by several letters from the army, particularly by one from General *Lyman*. Tis scarce credible, that the chief commanding officer, and one of such importance to the *French* interest, should be left by all his *regulars*, both officers and common soldiers, and in a wounded condition too, if they were generally alive. One would think, they must, for shame, have kept with him at all hazards. Thus much, I think must be allowed to be certain ; either that they were generally slain, or struck with such a panic, upon being pursued by our men, as to be out of the possession of themselves.

General *Johnson* and Major *Nichols* were wounded in this engagement ; and they only among the field-officers. The *General* received a Ball in his thigh ; but he can now walk about, and we hope will be able to proceed in person in further prosecution of our design, when the reinforcements are arrived. Col. *Titcomb* was the only officer, at least above a Captain, that fell in this second battle. He was shot dead on the spot. And his fall is the more to be regretted, as he was well experienced in the method of battering forts. He had a principal hand in the erection of all the batteries at *Louisbourg*, and commanded one at that siege, which was known by his name, and was eminently galling to the enemy. He went then, and now also, chiefly for the publick benefit ; and his name ought to be transmitted to posterity with honour.

One thing more may be worthy of notice with reference to this battle ; and that is, that among the 2 or 300 arms that have already
B been

* Perhaps the *Hatchet* (a weapon our men were all armed with) is, in our way of fighting, a more fatal instrument, than even the *broad Sword*, or *Bayonet*, if managed with skill. The *Indians* will readily fasten it in a man's skull, at more than a rod's distance. Many of our people are equally dextrous in the throw of it ; and all our men know its use so well, that tis certain death to a man to be within fair reach of their aim, when stretched forth to strike with it.

been bro't into the Camp, a number appear to have been those that were taken from us at the *Ohio-defeat*: From whence it is obvious to collect, that some of the *Indians*, or *Canadians*, or both, that came off conquerors at the *Monongahela*, were slain at *Lake-George*.— This was the fate particularly of Monsieur St. *Piere*, whose death is perhaps the greatest loss the *French* could have met with, at this day; as he was the chief commander of the *Indians*, and had most influence to engage them in any design against the *English*.

The *third* Engagement, as I may properly call it, was occasion'd thus.—Col. *Blanchard*, the chief officer at the Carrying-place, not knowing but they might need help at the *Camp*, detached to their assistance between 2 and 300 men, mostly *New-Hampshire*, some *Yorkers*, under the command of Capt. *McGinnis*. Between 4 and 5 o'clock they reached the place where Col. *Williams* had been attacked in the morning, and there they found about 500 of the enemy (chiefly *Indians*), who had fled from the former battle, and were come hither to refresh themselves, scalp our dead, take their packs, and get off. Our men fell upon them with the greatest fury, made prisoners of some, killed a great many, and intirely routed them; driving them off the ground, and recovering more of their packs than they could carry with them to the Camp. † It can scarce be accounted for, that they should be able to accomplish all this, upon any other supposition than *that* of the enemy's being dispirited with the dressing they had received a little before, and multiplying, in their fright, the numbers with which they were now beset. We lost but a few men in this fight. General *Johnston* says, two were killed, eleven wounded, and five missing. Among the wounded is Captain *McGinnis*, who behaved with prudence and valor. He is since dead of his wounds. The slaughter of the enemy was very considerable. The account we have received is, that we slew near an hundred of them: Thus ended the memorable 8th day of this instant *September*.

Our loss, upon the whole, amounts to 187 *English*; 126 killed, and 61 missing: Tho', of the missing, 20 are returned, and probably more

† This engagement was begun near the place, where the *French* had encamped the night before, and where they had left their baggage. Accordingly being thus driven off, our people the next day, bro't in 4 or 5 waggon loads of Ammunition, Provisions, Blankets, &c. And they since find, that their flight was so hasty, and so much in a fright, that, as they fled, they dropt their blankets, bread, and even some of the scaps of our men.

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more by this time. I can't learn, that the *Indians* lost more than from 15 to 20. The wounded are 94 *English*, and about 10 or 12 *Indians*. The *Massachusetts*-regiments are the greatest sufferers, and they were most in action. Two of their 3 colonels were killed, and one of their majors [another was wounded], besides several of their Captains and Lieutenants; and among them, are the greater part of the private men that were slain. The loss on the enemy's side was much greater than on our's. We know not the number of their wounded, but between five and six hundred were probably slain in all the engagements, and it may be yet more; for our people are daily finding dead bodies. The account from *New-York*, and *Albany* is 700: But the precise number of the slain will never be known. The *Indians* we are all sensible, are strangely solicitous to hide their dead, and will run all hazards to this end. And they have doubtless concealed numbers of their killed men. We are satisfied of this, not only from their known temper and practice, but from our having found at least 40 biers, [poles with cross-sticks of wood, hastily put together] besmeared with blood, upon which, it is supposed, they carried off numbers of their slain. Our people have also found some of their concealed dead, particularly 4 or 5 *Indians* in a sunk piece of land.

I may properly take notice here of, what I esteem, an excess of civility in our people towards the *French*.— They sent out parties, as soon as they could with conveniency, not only to bury their dead, but to bury as many of them as might be without the knowledge of the *Indians*, to prevent their being *scalped*. This I call an *excess* of civility, not indeed considered in itself simply, but comparing it with the conduct of the *French* towards us. They took no care to save any of our men, who fell at the *Southward*, this summer, from being *scalped*, but suffered them all, officers as well as common soldiers, to have this indignity offered to them by the *Indians*: And moreover, they left their dead bodies upon the field of battle, as we have been well assured, to putrify and rot there, unless they were devoured by the wolves and crows, and other beasts and birds of prey. Considering this inhuman conduct of the *French*, I can't but think, we exceeded in our civilities to the dead at *Lake-George*. For we have learnt by long experience, that unless we treat them as they treat us, we may expect ill usage at their hands.

As to the *Number* of the *French* and *Indians* engaged in this battle, it remains still uncertain. In the *New-York News-paper*, the



came to Town last post, they are said to have been 3376. The account stands thus. *Regulars*, 1126. *Militia*, 1200 form'd in 12 companies, with 20 regulars in each company. *Indian Traders*, 300. *Militia officers volunteers*, 30. *Cadets*, about 20. *Indians* 700. *Total*, 3376. 'Tis evident, I believe, from General *Diefkau's* papers, that he bro't this number with him from *Canada*, thus particularly ascertain'd : But whether he left any at *Crown-point*, or *Ticonderogo*, and if any, how many, cannot perhaps be reduced to a certainty. Thus much we may venture to say, as he knew our force, tis highly probable, he came with one that was superior. I cannot therefore suppose, he had less than 2000 *Canadians* and *Indians*, besides 5 or 600 *regulars* at least. We had about 2100 *New-England* men, and between 2 and 300 *Indians*. The rest of our men were partly confin'd by sickness, but mostly left at the *Carrying-place* to take care of the fort there.

Having thus given you as particular an account, as you can reasonably expect, at present, of this *victory* over the *French* and *Indians*, I can't, in consistency with the regard I have for my Country, restrain my self from going on to represent, in a few words, the IMPORTANCE of it to the *British* Interest.

You will, at once, be sensible of its great *Importance*, if you only turn the tables in your mind, and suppose the *French* had been *victors*, instead of our army.

Some, by giving a loose to their imaginations, have strangely heightened our melancholy condition, in this view of the matter. They have, in their fancies, block'd up all communication with our Troops at *Lake-Ontario*, and delivered our Governor, who is now there, a prey into *French* hands ;—they have look'd upon *Albany* as besieged, and taken ;—yea, they have transported the enemy to *New-York*, and entertain'd fearful apprehensions respecting the fate even of that city.—But these are vain imaginations, the imagery of mere fancy ; and must appear so to all, who will only call to mind, what was done at *Albany*, *Connecticut*, and the western parts of this Government, when it was known, that our army was attacked, but unknown what would be the issue. We have been well assured, they were beating to arms, and would have been upon the enemy, with triple their number, in a fortnight's time, had not tidings of our being conquerors rendered their immediate progress needless.

But though these fancied consequences would not have taken place,

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place, had the *French* come off victorious : yet others, and v
mischievous ones too, must have followed. Our *fort* at the Carryi
place would certainly have fallen into their hands, and toget
therewith all the artillery, ammunition, and stores, which had not b
taken by them at the *Camp* ;—awful numbers of our men must h
been slain, and captivated ; and, in a word, our whole army rout
and an entire end put to our design against *Crown-point*, at least
this year :—All which has been happily prevented, by its being
dered in providence, that the victory should fall on our side.

The *positive* advantages of this conquest are also very signal,
may be be worthy of particular notice.

Hereby the disgrace that was reflected on the *British* arms,
the banks of the *Monongahela*, is wholly wiped away. Were ;
of the *English* slain there ? A much greater number of *Fre*
and *Indians* (5 or 600) were slain *here*.—Were the *English* re
lars struck with a panic, when attacked *there* by *French* and *Ina*
irregulars ? The *French* *Regulars*, and *veterans* also, were sei
with an equal fright *here*, when pursued by *New-England Irre*
lars : Otherwise they would not have fled so universally, and in s
hurry, as to leave their *first officer* alone, not having a single man
help him.—Was the *British* *General* mortally wounded in *that*
gement ? So was the *French* *General* in *this* : (he is supposed
be dead of his wounds, before this time) Only the advantage lies
our side ; for *our* *General* was carried off by his own men, whereas
French *General* was left to fall a prisoner into his enemies hands

Hereby an happy turn has been given to the spirits of our n
on the one hand ; and an unhappy one to the enemy's on the oth
Our people, to an observing eye, were plainly under a depresso
casioned by the *horrid slaughter* at the *southward*, the like wher
had never before been seen, or heard of, in the Country ; while,
the other hand, the *French* and *Indians* were flusht with the vict
they had obtained, and disposed therefrom to undertake any thi
imagining there would be no standing before them : But, by w
was done at *Lake George*, this state of mind has luckily been invert
We are now raised in our spirits, they sunk in their's :—We go
in our design, animated with new life and vigor ; they oppose us
courage and intimidated :—We act against them as conquerors ; th
against us as having been fairly beat from the field of battle, a
quite routed.

In fine, hereby the strength of the enemy has been greatly weakened. They have lost their *General*, an experienced warrior, who was purposely sent from *France* to be at the head of their military affairs; and they have lost also, together with him, most of their officers of distinction and worth, and a great number of their common soldiers. 'Tis true, 2 or 3 of our chief officers, and 10 or 12 inferior ones, all men of bravery, were slain in the same field of battle, as well as a considerable number of our private men: But the loss on their side, with respect to officers as well as common soldiers, is far greater than on our's. Their prisoners say, their army is ruined. And, perhaps, after a deduction of their dead, their wounded, their captivated, their deserters, their lost and perished in the woods, their number (fitted for action) will not be more than *half* what it was, when they came forth against us. This is certainly a great advantage to us, and an equal disadvantage to them. They will doubtless, be reinforced from *Canada*; but so will our army from *New-England* and *Canada*, we know, can't supply such numbers of men, as it is the power of *New-England* to do. And, by reason of this effort of the *French*, in which they were intirely disappointed, we are better able to judge, what reinforcements may be necessary, and are more firmly spirited to raise and send them, with the quickest dispatch. And this reminds me of my promise, not to forget to give you *such* account of these reinforcements, as may be sufficient to open to you the *absolute necessity* of a large remittance from *Great-Britain*. And to this end, I need not be *particular*. It might be imprudent, under present circumstances, to be so: Tho' I may tell you, the *general-Assembly* of this province, who are now sitting, have, this week, acted the part of wise and kind fathers to this people, in sending home a representation of what has been done, with reference to this affair; and I cannot but hope, and believe, it will procure a removal of that heavy weight of *charge* that is now lying on us, and must sink us into ruin, if we don't receive support from our *mother-country*. I shall therefore only say in general, that the reinforcements already sent, and now going, to our army, will make it a very formidable one, to mean, for this part of the world; and the charge, arising from the pay, and subsistence, [almost doubled in its cost, by the difficulty of transportation] of such a body of men, must appear, to all who will allow themselves to think, to be far beyond the utmost ability of a few, or, infant, colonies; as the *New-England* ones certainly are. They are

are all engaged in the present expedition ; they will all therefore need assistance. Tho' this is emphatically true of the *Massachusetts-Province* : Nor can it be denied, they have the *first* and *best* claim [I would not say an exclusive one] to the pity and help of *Great-Britain*. They are the *Principals* in the enterprize on foot, and I think the *greatest* part in it. But this is not all : The better half of each of the Regiments raised, this spring, upon the establishment, under Major General *Shirley*, and Major General *Pepperrell*, were inhabitants of the *Massachusetts-Bay* ; and the other regiments, which are gone to *Nova-Scotia*, were almost wholly made up of men of the same *Province*. 'Tis true, these regiments are in the pay of the *crown* : But the benefit of the labour of so many men, in their proper business, is lost to the *Province* ; and further, the proportion of the tax that would have fallen to their share must now be taken from them, and fastened upon the other members of the Government ; which, you are sensible, will greatly increase their burden. Besides, no longer ago than last year we were at the expence of erecting a fort on the banks of *Kennebeck-River*, under the cover of 8 or 900 men raised for the purpose, principally with a view to secure our Sovereign's rights in those parts ; the expence of which fort, its erection, and maintenance to this day, has amounted to *Two Hundred Thousand Pounds*, our money, at the lowest computation. Nor is this all yet : As we are at war, not only with the *Indians* near *Canada*, but with all the tribes of *eastern India* (the *Penobscots* excepted, against whom also we are upon the point of proclaiming war,) we are obliged to keep a considerable number of our men constantly scouring the woods, from *east* to *west*, in a line of 2 or 300 miles, to defend our out-sets against their depredations.—In short, one *sixth* part of the effective men in the *Province* are, at this day, in military service ; and more than *double* the number on our own pay, than when we went against *Cape-Breton* : And if the burden of this expedition was justly tho't too heavy for us, much more is this the truth of the matter at present.—We stand indeed a sad chance of being an undone people, if we are not pitied, and relieved from the other side of the water.—'Twill otherwise be certainly impossible for us to engage in any enterprize the next year.—We shall have neither heart-disposing us, nor money enabling us, thereto : Whereas, if we are reimbursed this charge, and properly assured, that any other attempts shall be carried on at the expence of the *Crown*, it will give a spring to our vigor, and we shall join heart and hand in exerting our whole power to promote the service of our King in scouring his and our enemies.

And if we are thus supplied with money, let the *southern colonies* sleep on ; let the *New-York* government in particular, ingloriously sit still, and do nothing †, while

† Tho' *New-York* supply'd only 800 men upon the present expedition (300 of which they did not raise in their own government, being unwilling to lose so much of the labour of their people) : yet when a *large* reinforcement was found necessary, and a *greater* number of men than was at first sent, they chose to lay upon their own shoulders, not troubling themselves to raise a single man : So that the *whole* reinforcement of our army has been from the *New-England* colonies, who, to their honour be it spoken, have exerted themselves beyond what could have been expected. "plain, from the *spirit* and *conduct*, our *southern* brethren have discovered, that if anything is done to purpose against the *French*, it must be done by *New-England*. " Shall they not be assisted, in point of money, from *Great-Britain* ?—Can it, in



New-England Governments are raising and sending large reinforcements in defence, of those territories that are frontiers to them, and in the defence of which they fully should lay themselves out to the utmost : I say, if we of the *Massachusetts*-*Province*, together with the other *New-England* colonies, are properly encouraged and strengthened with money from home, we shall nothing regard the strange conduct of the *southern Governments*, but cheerfully and resolutely undertake any enterprise for the common good ; and doubt not, but we shall soon be able, without any assistance from them, under the smiles of providence, to bring down the pride of the *American* chieftains, and make them glad to be at peace with us upon any terms. We are soon to hear good tidings from our brethren, who, by this time, we would suppose, are gone from *Lake-George*, properly reinforced, in further prosecution of their designs. I am, with great Respect,

BOSTON, September
29th 1755.

Your affectionate Friend,
and humble Servant,

T. W.

S. The *Indians* have all left our Camp ; tho' not thro' disgust, but in compliance with a custom they have of going home after a battle, to rejoice and mourn, as there is reason for both, or either. They passed thro' *Albany* with many scores of scalps, mostly *scalps*, fastened on poles, and carried along in solemn triumph. They seemed highly pleased also with the laced hats and clothes, the guns, the watches, the pocket-money, &c. After plunder, our people were willing to let them have for their encouragement ; and very much added to their pleasure to hear, that Governor *Hardy* had bro't a present for them from his *Britannick Majesty*. Their return is expected in about a fortnight, with a much greater number from their several tribes, when Governor *Hardy* will, WITHOUT FRAUD, in person, in the name of his royal Master, deliver a present to them : Upon which they will rejoin our army. It is said, and I believe true, that they design to send to all the tribes of *Indians* in subjection to, and alliance with them, to sharpen their arrows, and come forth to revenge the death of their friends. — The fall of this *Indian Chief* is a great loss to us, as well as them. For he was a fast friend to the *English*, as an inveterate hater of the *French* ; having too much standing not to see thro' their designs, which he was convinced would finally end, in the accomplished, in the reduction of the *Indians* to a state of slavery. It was very much owing to his influence, that the *Six-Nations*, notwithstanding the abuses they have suffered from some *Yorkers*, have been so firmly attached to our interest. — Perhaps, there is not left, among all the *Indians* on the continent, a man equal to him in policy ; and in the strength and courage of a *Lyon*.

T. W.

It is, of reason, be tho't equal, that these colonies should be diminished and impoverished, while the growth of the *southern* ones, in number and riches, is hereby promoted ? — From the character we have of Governor *Hardy*, and the spirit he has already discovered, we hope *New-York*, under his administration, will act more as friends to the common *British* interest.

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